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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SHIRMAN MILLINER and 
GEORGE A. BURCH, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
ELMER FOX AND CO., DON A. 
STRINGHAM, LARRY M. 
FOLLETT, and STRINGHAM & 
FOLLETT, A professional corp., 
Defendants/Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
DON A. STRINGHAM, LARRY M. FOLLETT 
and STRINGHAM & FOLLETT, 
A Professional Corporation 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The complaint alleged violations of the Utah Uni-
form Securities Act and "negligence*' in connection with 
documents filed with the United States Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC). 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court dismissed the case for failure to 
state a claim and failure to join indispensable parties. 
Case No. 
13520 
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NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the lower court's judg-
ment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants offer no statement of facts. Their sum-
mary of selected allegations of the complaint is com-
pletely inadequate and omits any references to the record. 
Their statement of the grounds of the motions granted by 
the trial judge is simply not correct and no mention is 
made of the only "facts," as such, adduced in the trial 
court. Respondents must therefore supply a statement on 
which this Court can measure the lower court's disposi-
tion of the case. 
The complaint is in four counts, but only Counts I, 
II and IV refer to Respondents Don A. Stringham, Larry 
M. Follett and Stringham & Follett, a professional corpo-
ration (lawyer defendants). Counts II and III refer, in 
addition, to Respondent Elmer Fox & Co. (accountant de^ 
fendants). Because the legal standards for lawyers and 
accountants are significantly different under the securi-
ties laws, this brief will be addressed only to the facts 
and law touching upon the lawyer defendants, leaving 
the accountant defendants to state their case as they deem 
appropriate. 
The complaint alleges that Appellants purchased 
stock "in reliance" upon an offering circular filed by 
Commercial Liquidators (R. 32-33) pursuant to Federal 
law, and that Commercial Liquidator's offering circular 
and related documents were false. Significantly, the com-
2 
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plaint does not name Commercial Liquidators as a de-
fendant nor is it alleged that Appellants purchased any 
of the public offering stocks, old pursuant to the offering 
circular. Rather, the gist of the complaint is that the 
lawyer defendants should be liable because (1) they "were 
retained to prepare those filings'' (R. 32), (2) they 
allegedly supplied false information to the accountants 
(R. 32, 36) and (3) they allegedly performed their work 
negligently (R. 35). The complaint is based specifically 
upon UTAH CODE ANN. section 61-1-1, and the Hon-
orable Ernest F. Baldwin, District Judge, dismissed the 
case because, inter alia, no cause of action is available 
under that section. (R. 5, 12). 
Appellants made no effort to amend their pleadings. 
The allegations of the complaint were amplified by 
the deposition of Appellant Milliner ("tr." refers to the 
Milliner deposition) who testified that — contrary to the 
inferences of the complaint — the stock was not pur-
chased by the Appellants in the public offering but in 
routine market trades more than six months subsequent 
to the original offering at $1.25 per share, which was 
significantly above the offering price (tr. 78). Further, 
Milliner testified that the purchases were a step in a deal 
between Appellants and the notorious fugitive from jus-
tice (tr. 104) and reputed underworld "Don" of Salt Lake 
City, George Norman, in which a corporation owned by 
Appellants was to be acquired by Commercial Liquidators 
(tr. 14-15). Norman was neither officer, director or agent 
of Commercial Liquidators, and the admitted purpose of 
the proposed acquisition was to divert Commercial Liqui-
3 
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dators' funds from those purposes for which they were 
solicited and to finance Appellants' business ventures with 
them (tr. 17). As Miller put it: "We needed a com-
pany with assets. W e needed a company with some money 
so that they could manufacture our product and get it 
going." (tr. 17) 
The acquisition masterminded by Norman in fact 
occurred, and then a phenomenon typical of Salt Lake 
City securities markets (tr. 106) took place — the price 
of Commercial Liquidators stock rose dramatically, over 
a short span of time, from $1.25 (tr. 78) to $9.00 (Tr. 98) 
even though the only change in the company's fortunes was 
that // had assumed $35,000 of Appellants9 obligations. 
Norman then became a fugitive from justice and there-
after Norman's scheme was aborted, it may fairly be in-
ferred from Milliner's testimony (tr. 87, 90-91, 97, 104, 
106), when Milliner's attempted transfer of a block of his 
stock at the inflated price was refused by the transfer 
agent because Milliner was a "control person."* (tr. 90) 
Appellants then brought suit, not against Norman or 
the company, but against its former accountants and law-
yers over events which, even if they were as alleged, 
antedated Appellants' stock purchases by many months. 
We nevertheless approach the case, as we must, on the 
assumption that all facts well pleaded are taken as proven 
and that the issue before this Court is with respect to the 
adequacy of those pleadings. 
* Such a transaction has been construed an illegal public offering 
in violation of section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 
S77e) unless it conforms to the requirements of SEC Rule 144 
(17 CF.R. $230,144) 
4 
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ARGUMENT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Proceeding from naked statement of fact to argu-
ment upon those facts, it is appropriate to comment upon 
the true posture of this case. 
Salt Lake City — with an unfortunate reputation 
carried over from uranium boom days, with a rash of 
brokerage houses in bankruptcy, with some unsavory 
events on the Salt Lake Stock Exchange, and with a host 
of doubtful operators such as George Norman — has 
acquired notoriety as the "sewer of the securities indus-
try." See Wall Street Journal, February 25, 1974, at 1, 
col. 1. The Judiciary, and lawyers who are under attack 
in this case, are dedicated to securing the public against 
such practices. 
But in this case we are treated to the curious spectre, 
legal nicities aside, of two Norman dupes, up from the 
nether regions alluded to by the "Journal," in an audacious 
effort to enlist the judiciary to salvage their abortive and 
dubious scheme. In doing so they assault these lawyer 
defendants, who are not even alleged to have been con-
nected with their scheme, over alleged technical omissions 
in offering statements antedating their purchases and 
about which no purchaser in the public offering has 
uttered a murmur of complaint. Neither has the SEC, 
to whom those reports were submitted, leveled any criti-
cism at these lawyers. The "events," moreover, on which 
the complaint is based were nothing more than that the 
lawyer defendants held a security interest (on behalf of 
5 
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third parties)in certain of the assets of Commercial Liqui-
dators which was not revealed in the SEC filings, (tr. 108-
111). How their lien was "material" is not alleged, but 
in any event the lawyer defendants released the security 
interest immediately upon learning that Appellants ob-
jected to it, as the records of the Secretary of State will re-
veal, and it would seem thereby rendered any claimed 
defect moot. The complaint attempts to link the lawyer 
defendants' services to Appellants' later transactions by 
alleging that they had seen the public offering filings and 
"relied" upon them. How Appellants could simultane-
ously rely upon the public offering documents while they 
were engaged in a scheme to subvert them is difficult to 
conceive. Indeed, the facts clearly indicate that they relied 
upon something quite apart from the public offering 
documents (tr. 87, 106). 
It would seem, therefore, that Appellants seek to 
make capital of the wave of terror which has struck the 
legal community in the wake of cases such as SEC v. Na-
tional Student Marketing Corp., Civil No. 225-72 
(S.D.N.Y., filed February 3, 1972), which have posed 
the as yet unsettled question of the lawyer's duty to re-
port to the SEC when his client violates the federal securi-
ties laws. Obviously, no such question is present in this 
case and could not be, since the lawyer defendants had not 
been counsel to the company for*a period of some six 
months prior to Appellants "»e4 ." 
Judge Baldwin dismissed the case because it was de-
fective as a matter of pleading. The foregoing matters did 
not enter into the trial judge's decision — indeed, they 
6 
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were not even broached before him. W e seek no more 
than this Court's affirmation of the complaint's inade-
quacy, but it is nevertheless important to see the issue in 
its true perspective. 
POINT I 
THE BRIEF OF APPELLANTS FAILS TO DIS-
CUSS THE GROUNDS ON WHICH THE 
CASE WAS DISMISSED 
At page 3 of the Brief of Appellants it is asserted that 
defendants asserted three grounds for dismissal. The first 
ground stated, "no privity on [sic] contract," was assert-
ed by the accountant defendants but no such ground was 
asserted by these lawyer defendants nor does the Brief 
of Appellants address the broader ground, failure to plead 
any "connection," which the lawyer defendants did assert. 
The second and third grounds stated — that there is no 
cause of action under UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-1 and 
absence of indispensable parties — were indeed asserted, 
but the indispensable parties were broader than just Com-
mercial Liquidators. Obviously, on this set of facts 
George Norman and others as yet unnamed should also 
be included. 
But the brief omits any mention of two fundamental 
grounds on which the action was dismissed. First, be-
cause the complaint "fails to plead with particularity the 
alleged fraudulent acts or omissions . . . upon which the 
plaintiffs allegedly rely," and, second, because the com-
plaint "fails to allege the necessary causal relationship, or 
connection . . ." (R. 18, 19) The second point is based 
7 
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upon three sub-points: (1) failure to allege breach of any 
duty of these defendants as lawyers, (2) failure to allege 
any offer or sale as required by the Utah Uniform Securi-
ties Act, and (3) failure to allege that the plaintiffs were 
within any group of persons to whom the statements in 
the SEC filings were directed. Any of these grounds were 
adequate to justify dismissal, yet Appellants fail to so 
much as mention them. 
Appellants have thus resorted to the familiar lawyer's 
ploy of setting up a wholly imaginary case, then pro-
ceeding to argue against their artificially contrived issues. 
This Court knows, however, that the case must be tested 
against the reasons for dismissal which influenced the 
trial judge. Those reasons included the absence of a pri-
vate cause of action under UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-1, 
which Appellants do discuss and which we treat here-
after, but also the following grounds which the Brief 
of Appellants fails to so much as mention. 
A. The Complaint Fails to Allege Fraud With Particu-
larity. 
The lawyer defendants are named in but the first, 
third and fourth causes of action. However, all four causes 
of action sound in fraud. Rule 9(b), UTAH R. CIV. PRO. 
requires that "the circumstances constituting fraud or 
mistake shall be stated with particularity." The complaint 
fails to satisfy that rule. 
A separate but related problem is that the Appellants 
failed to so much as allege the elements of fraud, much 
less the particulars of the facts establishing those elements. 
Usually it is required that six specific elements must be 
8 
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alleged: First, a representation by the defendant, second, 
which was materially false and, third, known by the de-
fendant to be false, fourth, on which the plaintiff relied, 
fifth, while acting with ordinary prudence, and sixth, 
proximate cause. RESTATEMENT, TORTS, §255. These 
requirements are firmly rooted in the common law, 
Derry v. Peek, 14 A.C. 337, and are required by this Court 
and every other jurisdiction. Cf. Davis Stock Co. v. Hill, 
268 P. 2d 988, 2 Utah 2d 20 (1954). 
These requirements obtain in any action sounding in 
fraud, but they are of special applicability when the object 
of the allegations is an attorney. Because of his role as an 
officer of the court, because of the confidential and highly 
personal nature of the services he is called upon to render, 
and because of the extreme vulnerability of the lawyer 
before the bar association and in the eye of the public 
when confronted with accusations by his clients, it is 
right and proper that the plaintiff be required to state the 
basis of his claims with particularity. This Court has so 
held in Heathman v. Hatch, 372 P.2d 990, 13 Utah 2d 
266 (1962). 
B. The Complaint Fails to Allege Breach of Any Duty 
of the Lawyer Defendants. 
The gist of the complaint against the lawyer defend-
ants is that they performed services for Commercial 
Liquidators, and that thereafter Appellants relied upon 
these services which allegedly were performed negligently. 
Of significance is the fact that Appellants were not clients 
of the lawyer defendants nor were they even shareholders 
9 
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of the corporate client at the time the services were per-
formed. 
Viewed as an effort to state some breach of duty in 
the lawyer-client relationship, the complaint falls far 
short of stating a claim. First, and most obvious, Appel-
lants fail to allege that they were within the attorney-
client relationship, either directly or derivatively as a 
shareholder. Patently, an attorney is not an insurer of his 
services for the whole world. His duties, such as they are, 
extend only to those with whom he contracts. See ABA 
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, E.C 5-1: 
"The professional judgment of a lawyer should be 
exercised . . . solely for the benefit of his client 
. . . . the desires of third persons should {not] be 
permitted to dilute his loyalty to his client." 
See also Smoot v. Lund, 369 P.2d 933, 13 Utah 2d 168, 
172 (1962). 
But there is a second and perhaps more compelling 
reason why Appellants' allegation of the lawyer defend-
ants' negligence misses its intended mark. Even if Appel-
lants could be considered, somehow, within the attorney-
client relationship it is clear that their highly technical 
allegations concerning the preparation of the offering 
circular do not state any breach of the lawyer defendants' 
duties. That is so because the lawyer does not guarantee 
absolutely and in all events the adequacy of his work. He 
is held, rather, to the standard of reasonable care of a 
prudent lawyer in like circumstances. These standards 
were well stated by the California Supreme Court in the 
leading case of Lucas v. Ham, 364 P.2d 685, 689, 56 Cal. 
2d 583, 591 (1961): 
10 
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"The attorney is not liable for every mistake he 
may make in his practice; he is not, in the absence 
of an express agreement, an insurer of the sound-
ness of his opinions or the validity of an instrument 
he is engaged to draft; and he is not liable for 
being in error as to a question of law on which 
reasonable doubt may be entertained by well in-
formed lawyers." 
Surely a sophisticated subject such as securities practice, 
which but a handful of Utah lawyers even hold them-
selves out as being qualified to engage in, must be one on 
which "reasonable doubt may be entertained by well in-
formed lawyers." But be that as it may, Appellants failed 
to even allege the breach of the applicable standard. 
C. The Complaint Fails to Allege Sufficient "Connec-
tion" Between the Acts Complained of and the Se-
curities Transaction. 
If the complaint be viewed as an effort to allege that 
the "duty" the lawyer defendants are supposed to have 
breached is found in the Utah Uniform Securities Act, 
rather than in the lawyer-client relation, it is still inade-
quate as a matter of pleading. That is so because in that 
event it contains no allegation of the requisite "connec-
tion" between the conduct of the lawyer defendants and 
the securities transaction. That Appellants fail to com-
prehend this alternate basis on which the trial judge dis-
missed the action is evident in their arguments relative 
to "privity of contract," which discussion simply misses 
the point. Privity of contract could supply the necessary 
connection, but even assuming the obvious conclusion 
11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that privity is not necessary in all cases, it is still necessary 
to plead and prove some connection between the acts com-
plained of and the securities transaction. 
This requirement of pleading and proving the "con-
nection" is a fundamental ingredient under all of the 
state securities laws. See CCH BLUE SKY REP. 53571.08: 
"the purchaser must show that he acted upon 
statements known to be false, that his own posi-
tion was such as to warrant him in so acting, and 
that the statement was as to a fact material to 
the transaction." 
The requirement has its roots in the common law where, 
in analogous cases, it was held that misstatements in a 
public offering circular were actionable only by those to 
whom they were directed — not by remote purchasers 
such as Appellants. See Peek v. Gurney, 43 L. J. Ch. 
(n.s.) 19 (1873). The United States Supreme Court has 
adopted the same rationale in cases involving comparable 
provisions of the federal securities laws, where it is held 
that the statements complained of, even assuming their 
inaccuracy, must at least be directed at the plaintiff in the 
sense that they were intended to mislead him. SEC v. 
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 192 
n 39 (1963). See also Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F. 2d 269 
(2d Cir. 1967). 
The "connection" required by the Utah Uniform Se-
curities Act is a very explicit one. UTAH CODE ANN. 
* See §12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C $77/(2). 
12 
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§61-1-22 extends liability in a private cause of action to 
"any person who . . . offers or sells a security." The 
lawyer defendants plainly did not offer or sell a security 
and the complaint does not allege that they did. Under 
comparable language of the federal securities laws it is 
held that liability is confined to the immediate purchaser 
not a remote purchaser such as Appellants. See Lanza v. 
Drexel & Co., 479 F. 2d 1277, 1298-99 (2d Cir. 1973). 
POINT II 
IMPLIED REMEDIES ARE NOT AVAILABLE 
UNDER THE UTAH UNIFORM SECURI-
TIES ACT 
Appellants' brief is directed, in the main, to the trial 
judge's conclusion that an implied remedy is not available 
under UTAH CODE ANN. §61-1-1, on which the com-
plaint was based. In this regard the trial judge was emin-
ently correct and his decision should be affirmed. 
Appellants concede that there is no express civil 
remedy under the statutory provisions relied upon, but 
reason that this Court should imply a remedy because the 
federal courts have done so under comparable federal 
statutes. What the federal courts may choose to do is 
obviously not binding, or for that matter even persuasive, 
as to what this Court shall do with respect to the state laws. 
But Appellants are not correct in any event, for in analog-
ous circumstances the federal courts have not implied a 
remedy. 
13 
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A. Implied Remedies Are Not Available Where Express 
Remedies Are Created. 
The principal fallacy in the argument that an im-
plied remedy should be available under UTAH CODE 
ANN. §61-1-1 is that an express remedy is created by 
Utah Code Annotated §61-1-22. Significantly, subsection 
(a) of UTAH CODE ANN. §61-1-22 refers to five specific 
sections of the Uniform Securities Act on which a private 
claim for damages may be based, but UTAH CODE ANN. 
§61-1-1 is not among them. The accountant defend-
ants have ably analyzed the pertinent statutes at pages 
9-16 of their brief and we shall not burden the Court with 
a duplication of that discussion. As the accountant defend-
ant's brief makes clear, the legislature has spoken on the 
subject and, under the familiar doctrine expressio unius 
est exclusio alterious another remedy may not be implied. 
See Hansen v. Board of Education, 116 P. 2d 936, 101 
Utah 15 (1941). 
B. An "offer" or "sale" Was Not Alleged. 
Appellants might have amended their complaint to 
correct this rather obvious defect by alleging their action 
under the proper section, but they did not do so. The 
reason is quite obvious — it was impossible to allege the 
elements required by UTAH CODE ANN. §61-1-22, 
which reads in pertinent part as follows: 
"Any person who 
• • • 
"(b) offers or sells a security {by prohibited means} 
is liable to the person buying the security from 
him . . . ." 
14 
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These lawyer defendants plainly did not sell the Appel-
lants their stock, or any stock, and Appellants plainly 
did not buy their stock from the lawyer defendants, and 
for reasons Appellants have not seen fit to disclose (but 
which can be fairly inferred) the real sellers were never 
joined as defendants. 
Thus, our legislature has declared what "connection" 
is required to support an action under the state securities 
law. The action contemplated must be one between the 
buyer and seller. No provision is made for actions by re-
mote purchasers such as these Appellants, or against 
parties whose involvement in the alleged sale was as tenu-
ous as that alleged against the lawyer defendants. 
Of course, Appellants do not base their action on 
UTAH CODE ANN. §61-1-22. They ask this Court to 
declare that they can fashion their own theory of recov-
ery, based on sections of the Act which the legislature 
explicity said could not be so used (see discussion at pages 
15-16 of accountant defendants brief), and based upon 
elements which they shall devise. Surely, even if an action 
could be founded on sections other than those specified 
by the legislature this Court should require that the "con-
nection" visualized by the legislature be alleged and 
proven. Absence of any allegation of an "offer" and 
"sale" therefore justifies the trial judge's dismissal. 
C. Federal Precedent Rejects An Implied Remedy. 
Appellants' argument that the implied remedy under 
Rule 10b-5 (17 CF.R. §240.10b-5) adopted under section 
10b of the Securities Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C § 78j) supports 
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their claim of implied remedies under the state act is in-
appropriate and evidences a lack of perceptive analysis. 
That remedy was created to cover a haitus in the scheme 
of federal regulations which resulted because the express 
remedy provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 cover only 
fraudulent sales of securities and securities sales effected 
pursuant to a registration statement. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 
77k(a), 111 and 77q(a). Thus, the express remedies of the 
1933 Act did not cover transactions effected on the se-
curities exchange which the 1934 Act was adopted to regu-
late nor did the earlier act deal with fraudulent purchases, 
which the rule is also concerned with. No such haitus is 
evident in the state act for the legislature has supplied 
a remedy to cover all transactions as to which a remedy 
was intended. 
Of significance in this connection, however, is that 
the federal courts — whatever merit may be assigned to 
the manner in which they have implied remedies — have 
usually declined to imply a remedy in circumstances where 
an express remedy is available under the 1933 Act. Thus, 
when confronted with a sale pursuant to a registration 
statement, which might be subject to the express remedy 
under 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a), the federal courts have held 
that an action may not be maintained under Rule 10b-5 
and 15 U.S.C. §78j or that if it is the plaintiff must never-
theless plead and prove the elements specified in 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77k(a). See Montaque v. Electronic Corporation of 
America, 76 F. Supp. 33 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); Rosenberg v. 
Globe Aircraft Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123 (E. D. Pa. 1948). 
Viewed in perspective, therefore, the federal prece-
dent rejects, rather than supports, Appellants position. If 
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the federal courts have declined to upset the congressional 
scheme of regulation by implying remedies where express 
remedies are available, even though construing separate 
acts adopted by separate legislative sessions, how much 
more compelling is it that this court decline to upset the 
regulatory scheme of the state legislature by implying 
under one section a remedy which would be inconsistent 
with that of another section contained in the same act? 
D. The Liabilities of the Lawyer Defendants are Dis-
tinguishable From Those of Accountants or Weighers. 
In Point I of Appellants' brief it is suggested that, 
because liabilities have been imposed at common law and 
under the securities laws against accountants and weigh-
ers, similar liabilities should be imposed against these 
lawyer defendants. These argument will simply not with-
stand legal analysis and such generalizations are loose and 
reckless. Without suggesting that liability lies even as to 
the accountants in this case, which is a subject we leave 
to the accountant defendants' brief, it must be emphasized 
that there is a vast difference between the liability of ac-
countants and the liability of lawyers. Counsel should 
at least examine those differences before asking this Court 
to adopt the apparent non-sequitur that because those of 
one professional calling have duties to third persons such 
duties flow from all professional relations. 
Liabilities have been imposed under the federal laws 
on accountants, in a host of cases, but they proceed on 
considerations having no applicability at all to lawyers. 
The Federal securities laws create express duties for ac-
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countants which have no counterpart in the state laws 
and no counterpart even in the federal laws with respect 
to lawyers. Most of the cases dealing with liability of 
accountants have been based upon section 11 of the Se-
curities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. § 77k) which creates an 
express cause of action against an accountant who ' "ex-
pertises" a registration statement. The leading case in 
this regard is Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp., 283 
F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Section 11 imposes no such 
liability upon lawyers. 
Moreover, unlike lawyers, accountants hold them-
selves out as being engaged in a public trust and their 
liabilities flow from that holding out. See DIVISION OF 
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF THE AMERICAN INSTI-
TUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, PRO-
POSED RESTATEMENT OF THE CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL ETHICS, page 8 (1972): 
"The reliance of the public, the government 
and the business community on sound financial 
reporting and advice on business affairs, and the 
importance of these matters to the economic and 
social aspects of life impose particular obligations 
on certified public accountants . . . 
$ * * 
The ethical Code of the American Institute 
emphasizes the profession's responsibility to the 
public, a responsibility that has grown as the num-
ber of investors has grown, as the relationship be-
tween corporate managers and stockholders has be-
come more impersonal and as government increas-
ingly relies on accounting information." 
It is natural, therefore, that the courts have held the ac-
countant liable to members of the public who rely on his 
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reports to their detriment. By contrast, compare the more 
limited holding out of the legal profession, quoted in 
Point I, B. (p. 10) 
Further, regulations under the Federal securities laws 
have created express obligations for accountants. See 17 
C.F.R. §§210.2-01, 210.2-02, 210.3-06. See also Toucbe, 
Niven, Bailey and Smart, 37 SEC 629, 670 (1957). Neither 
Federal nor state laws or regulations create comparable 
obligations for lawyers. 
Thus the only authorities cited in Appellants' brief 
have no application whatsoever to these lawyer defend-
ants. The inapplicability of the as yet unadopted Restate-
ment section is ably discussed at pages 7-8 of the brief of 
the accountant defendants. The situation of a public 
weigher is too dissimilar to merit discussion, but in any 
event the distinction is evident in Appellants' own dis-
cussion at page 5 of their brief where they concede that 
the weigher (unlike these lawyer defendants) "furnished 
{information} primarily for a third person." Biakanja v. 
Irving, 4 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P. 2d 16 (1958) is the only au-
thority cited by Appellants which involves a lawyer in 
any way, but it does not deal even remotely with the mat-
ters posed by this case. In Biakanja a lawyer was sued for 
his malpractice in failing to have a will executed prop-
erly. The case does not involve a claim of implied liabili-
ties under a state securities act, nor does it hold that re-
mote claimants such as these Appellants, who were not 
parties to the lawyer-client relationship or intended bene-
ficiaries of it, can maintain an action. 
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Indeed, Biakanja merely begs the question posed 
herein, for even on those dissimilar facts the California 
court declared that liability was dependent, among other 
factors, on "the closeness of the connection" between the 
defendant's conduct and the injury suffered. Id. at 19. 
The trial judge dismissed this action, inter alia, for failure 
to so much as allege the necessary "connection," but Ap-
pellants do not even discuss that crucial point. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should not dignify Appellants with a 
formal opinion, but should simply affirm, per curiam. Any 
other action on pleadings so defective, and without the 
benefit of briefing by plaintiffs who fit within the remedy 
contemplated by the legislature, would be likely to estab-
lish dangerous precedent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PARKER M. NIELSON 
Attorney for 
Defendants-Respondents 
Don A. Stringham, Larry M. Follett 
and Stringham and Follett 
318 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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